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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Albert Ciccone was charged with two counts of first degree murder (by premeditation) 
after he struck his wife with his car, killing her and the fetus in her womb. A jury found 
Mr. Ciccone guilty of first degree murder with respect to his wife, but it found him guilty of the 
lesser offense of second degree murder with respect to the fetus. The district court imposed a 
fixed life sentence for the first degree murder and a fifteen year fixed sentence for the second 
degree murder. 
On appeal Mr. Ciccone presents three issues for this Court's consideration: (1) whether 
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his closing arguments; (2) whether Mr. Ciccone's 
constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial were violated; and (3) whether Mr. Ciccone's 
fixed life sentence is excessive. He respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction 
and/or sentence and either: order that the case be dismissed based on violations of his speedy 
trial rights; remand the case for a new trial based on the prosecutor's misconduct; or reduce his 
fixed life sentence (or remand the case for a new sentencing hearing) based on the excessiveness 
of that sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In June 1996, Albert Ciccone, who was then nineteen years old, continued a family 
tradition by enlisting in the United States Air Force. (PSI, pp.1, 12, 16.)1 Although his Air Force 
1 The present appeal is the second one arising out of Mr. Ciccone's convictions. The first appeal 
was originally designated No. 32179, and later re-designated No. 36877. On May 31,2011, the 
Idaho Supreme Court augmented the record in the present appeal with the appellate record from 
the earlier appeal. Because the appellate record from the earlier appeal contains the bulk of the 
proceedings, it is the appellate record primarily relied upon herein. Citations to that record do not 
contain any identifying prefix. In contrast, citations to the supplemental appellate record 
prepared specifically for this appeal are identified with the prefix "No. 38817." 
1 
serVIce took him to various duty stations III the United States and abroad, the bulk of 
Mr. Ciccone's career was spent at Mountain Home Air Force Base here in Idaho. (See PSI, p.16.) 
In early 2003, while living in Mountain Home, Mr. Ciccone met, and fell in love with, 
Kathleen Terry. (PSI, p.14.) They quickly moved in together and, on August 29, 2003, were 
married. (PSI, p.l4.) Less than two weeks later, the couple was thrilled to learn that they were 
pregnant. (PSI, p.l4.) 
Unfortunately, the passionate young couple's fast-moving relationship was far from 
perfect. By all accounts, it was extremely turbulent, typified as much by the lows of bitter 
arguments, separations, and Mr. Ciccone's intense depression, as it was by the highs of 
courtship, love, and the exciting prospect of a new life together. (See, e.g., PSI, p.14 
(Mr. Ciccone's description of the "soap-opera" that was his relationship with Kathleen).) Indeed, 
in September of 2003, after one of the numerous arguments, Mr. Ciccone attempted suicide. 
(PSI, pp.14-15.) Fortunately, he survived and was admitted to Intermountain Hospital, a 
psychiatric hospital in Boise. (PSI, p.15.) However, shortly after his release from Intermountain 
Hospital, Mr. Ciccone learned that his wife had not only been unfaithful, but that she had 
contracted Chlamydia in the process and may have even passed that sexually transmitted disease 
to him. (See Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1258, L.12 - p.1259, LA, p.1429, L.3 p.4l32, L.19.) Not too 
surprisingly, another argument ensued and the couple separated for a time. (Tr. Vol. VIII, 
p.1389, L.20 - p.1390, L.22, p.l43l, L.18 - p.1432, L.8; see Tr., p.1257, Ls.7-20.) 
Within a week or so, the couple attempted to reconcile. (PSI, p.15.) On August 16,2003, 
they attended a couples' counseling session with a civilian social worker employed by the Air 
Force. (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1508, L.22 - p.1509, L.22, p.15l5, Ls.7-l1.) During that counseling 
session, the social worker attempted to provoke Mr. Ciccone by "punch[ing] his buttons a couple 
of times"; to a limited extent, he was successful as he managed to make Mr. Ciccone "really 
2 
upset" to the point where Mr. Ciccone left the room; however, Mr. Ciccone calmed down and 
returned. (Ir. Vol. VIII, p.15l7, L.16 - p.1518, L.25, p.1525, L.23 - p.1526, L.l1.) Indeed, by 
the end of the one-hour session, "[t]hey seemed to be in pretty good shape" (except that the 
counselor believed Mr. Ciccone was still upset with him), the counselor did not see any risk of 
harm coming to either Kathleen or Mr. Ciccone, and, shortly after the appointment, Kathleen and 
Mr. Ciccone appeared to be affectionate, happy, and attentive to one another's needs. (Ir. Vol. 
VIII, p.14l6, L.12 - p.1417, L.19, p.15l9, L.15 -p.1520, L.5, p.1523, Ls.19-23.) 
After leaving the base, Kathleen and Mr. Ciccone stopped at a Burger King restaurant to 
pick up food to bring back to Kathleen's mother's house, which was where Kathleen was staying 
while the couple was separated. (Oct. 16, 2003 Interview Ir., p.34, Ls.16-20, pAO, L.5 - p.lO.) 
When they arrived at Kathleen's mother's house, they had another argument. (PSI, p.l1.) 
Kathleen got mad, threw the food at her husband, and marched off down the road. (PSI, p.ll.) 
After cleaning his dinner off of his uniform, Mr. Ciccone decided to head home to his 
apartment. (PSI, p.ll.) Apparently still angry and frustrated though, he punched the accelerator 
and flew through the gears of his powerful little sports car. (See PSI, p.ll; see also Ir. Vol. VIII, 
p.l674,Ls.16-23, p.1692, Ls-.18~22.) He then lost control and collided with his wife? (PSI, 
p.1l.) Tragically, Kathleen died from her injuries. (See Ir. Vol. VIII, p.560, L.20 p.566, L.7.) 
After striking Kathleen (and a mailbox), Mr. Ciccone stopped, got out of his car, and 
looked toward his wife's lifeless body. (Ir. Vol. VIII, p.5l5, Ls.6-14, p.5l6, Ls.14-20.) 
Strangely, he did not approach her; instead, he called his mother and, in a daze, wandered down 
the road and, eventually, out into the desert. (Ir. Vol. VIII, p.5l6, L.1l - p.20, p.518, L.22-
2 Mr. Ciccone is mindful of the fact that a jury ultimately found otherwise, but he contends that, 
while he may have been foolishly reckless in his driving, he did not deliberately strike his wife 
and he certainly did not do so premeditatedly. 
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p.5l9, L.ll, p.598, L.1O - p.600, L.12, p.609, L.3 - p.6l1, L.19, p.617, Ls.lO-16, p.6l8, Ls.l2-
25; PSI, p.ll.) According to Mr. Ciccone's mother, Mr. Ciccone's voice was unrecognizable 
when he first called her and, eventually, he began screaming hysterically, saying that he had been 
in an accident and was afraid Kathleen was hurt and needed help, and that he did not know 
where he was and felt like his head and chest were going to explode. (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1704, 
Ls.6-8, p.1705, L.20 - p.1706, L.5.) 
Eventually, Mr. Ciccone was spotted standing on a ridge about a mile into the desert and 
was contacted and handcuffed by authorities. (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.61O, L.24 - p.6l1, L.19, p.613, 
LA - p.6l4, L.14, p.669, L.6 - 670, L.ll.) He did not try to flee or resist in any way. (Tr. Vol. 
VIII, p.613, Ls.16-22, p.620, Ls.19-24.) He was walked back to the road, treated by medical 
personnel at the scene, and taken to a local hospital. (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.6l4, L.19 - p.615, L.l1, 
p.1l64, L.17 - p.1165, L.13.) Shortly before midnight, Mr. Ciccone was arrested and 
interrogated. (See Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1475, L.23 - p.1476, L.14 (Detective Wolfe testifying that she 
sought Mr. Ciccone's release from the hospital then, shortly before midnight, began interrogating 
him at the Elmore County Sheriff's Office); Oct. 16,2003 Interview Tr., p.12, L.9 - p.15, LA 
(Detective Wolfe reading Mr. Ciccone his Miranda rights and explaining that she had to do so 
because Mr. Ciccone was being held involuntarily), pA5, Ls.1-15 (Detective Wolfe explaining 
that, although Mr. Ciccone was in "custody" pursuant to an "investigative hold," he was "not 
under arrest"), p.165, L.15 - p.17l, L.12 (Detective Wolfe explaining, at the conclusion of the 
interrogation, that Mr. Ciccone would be "put in custody for murder," and that he would be 
photographed and fingerprinted before spending the night in jail).) The following day, 
(October 17, 2003), Mr. Ciccone was charged with two counts of first degree murder (by 
premeditation)--one count for Kathleen, and one count for her unborn fetus. (R., pp.8-l0.) 
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Mr. Ciccone's preliminary hearing began on October 30, 2003, but ended up being a 
piecemeal affair, stretching out over some two and one-half months. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, 
p.17, L.22 - p.78, L.11 (proceedings held on October 30,2003); Tr. Vol. II, p.79, L.l - p.8S, 
1.16 (proceedings held on November 19,2003); Tr. Vol. II, p.86, L.l - p.164, 1.23 (proceedings 
held on December 15,2003); Ir. Vol. IV (proceedings held on December 29,2003); Tr. Vol. V 
(proceedings held on January 12, 2004). At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, 
Mr. Ciccone was bound over on both charges. (Tr. Vol. V, p.78, Ls.3-25.) Approximately two 
weeks later, on January 27, 2004, the district court entered an Order Holding Defendant to 
Answer. (R., pp.58-59.) That same day, the State filed its Information. (R., pp.60-61.) 
At his arraignment on February 2, 2004, Mr. Ciccone entered not guilty pleas and 
requested a jury trial. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.4, Ls.5-7.) Accordingly, the district court set the case for up 
to a two week trial, with jury selection set to begin on July 20, 2004, and the trial itself set to 
begin on July 23,2004. (R., p.66; Tr. Vol. VI, p.4, Ls.9-10, p.7, L.5 - p.9, 1.11.) The district 
court also admonished the attorneys for both parties that they should be prepared to proceed with 
trial as scheduled: "Counsel, I will tell you right now, this is going to be a relatively firm trial 
date because we're---because of the Severson trial in June, we're running this up pretty close to 
the 180-day requirement." (Ir. Vol. VI, p.6, Ls.15-19.) 
At the pretrial conference of June 21, 2004 (less than a month before jury selection was 
to begin), the State gave no hint that it might need, or want, a continuance. (See generally 
Tr. VoL VI, p.10, L.1 - p.25, L.13.) Nevertheless, on July 16,2004, approximately 274 days 
after Mr. Ciccone was arrested, and only four days before jury selection was set to begin, the 
State moved to continue Mr. Ciccone's trial on the basis that certain "material" witnesses were 
"unavailable." (R., pp.1 02-08.) 
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On July 19, 2004, the day before jury selection was to have begun, the district court heard 
arguments on the State's motion. (See generally Tr. Vol. VII, p.1, L.l - p.44, L.22.) At the 
hearing, the State reiterated the grounds set forth in its motion (Tr. Vol. VII, p.8, L.2 - p.13, 
L.14), and also identified additional grounds which it argued supported its motion (see Tr. Vol. 
VII, p.15, L.9 - p.19, L.9). In response, Mr. Ciccone objected to any continuance and asserted 
his right to a speedy trial (Tr. Vol. VII, p.19, Ls.17-23), arguing through his attorney that "[w]e 
are ready to go" to trial. (Tr. Vol. VII, p.22, Ls. 21-22.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
district court granted the State's motion, continuing the trial for nearly six months, to 
January 2005. (Tr. Vol. VII, p.25, L.25 - p.36, L.18.) The following day, it entered a written 
order granting the State's motion and re-setting the trial date. (R., p.114.) That order, as well as a 
revised scheduling order issued the same day, indicated that jury selection was to begin on the 
afternoon of January 4,2005, and the trial itself was to begin on the morning of January 7, 2005. 
(R., pp.114, 116-17.) 
On December 20, 2004, approximately three weeks before his trial was to begin, 
Mr. Ciccone filed a motion for dismissal based upon a violation of his constitutional and 
statutory rights to a speedy trial. (R., pp.168~69,) That motion was heard on January 3, 2005. 
(See generally Tr. Vol. VIII, pAO, L.3 - pA4, L.21.) During the hearing, the district court denied 
the motion on the basis that "good cause" had been shown for the nearly six-month continuance. 
(Tr. Vol. VIII, p.43, L.18 - p.44, L.2l.) Later, it entered a written order to that effect. 
(R., pp.180-8l.) 
Beginning with jury selection on January 4, 2005, Mr. Ciccone's trial was held over 
portions of eleven different days in January of 2005. (See generally Tr. Vol. VIII, p.61, L.1 -
p.1869, L.20.) Toward the end of trial, during the prosecutor's closing arguments in rebuttal, he 
made a number of arguments which are of concern on appeal. First, he asserted as follows: 
6 
"There's only two people that know [the details of the argument immediately prior to Kathleen's 
death], and Kathleen Ciccone isn't here to tell us." (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1853, Ls.21-23.) A short 
time later, he argued that "[t]here is no testimony" that Mr. Ciccone was distracted or not looking 
at Kathleen immediately prior to striking her with his vehicle. (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1856, Ls.2-9.) 
Finally, the prosecutor made the following plea: "When you kill somebody, you take away 
everything they have and everything they ever will have. Kathleen was 22 years old. Her death is 
a tragedy. Give her life meaning and give her death the sense of justice that it requires." (Tr. Vol. 
VIII, p.1860, Ls.15-22.) 
During the late afternoon of January 25, 2005, shortly after the prosecutor made the 
above arguments, the jury was excused to begin its deliberations. (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1868, LsA-6.) 
The following day, the jury returned with its verdicts. (R., pp.284, 286-89, 290-93.) It found 
Mr. Ciccone guilty of first degree murder with respect to Kathleen, and second degree murder 
with respect to the fetus. (R., pp.284, 286-89, 290-93.) 
On June 7, 2005, a sentencing hearing was held. (See generally Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1870, L.l 
- p.1954, L.25.) After hearing extensive "victim impact" statements urging the district court to 
impose prison sentences which would ensure that Mr. Ciccone never has an opportunity for 
release (see, e.g., Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1890, L.24 - p.1891, L.2 (statement of Kathleen's sister), 
p.1893, Ls.20-23 (statement of Kathleen's father), p.197, Ls.5-24 (statement of Kathleen's 
mother)), and a prosecutorial request for the same (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1932, L.22 - p.1933, L.7), the 
district court did, in fact, impose a fixed life sentence for Kathleen's murder (as well as a 
sentence of fifteen years, all fixed, for the murder of the fetus). (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1949, L.I8 -
p.1950, L.I0.) 
On August 2, 2005, Mr. Ciccone filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.346-49.) That appeal 
(originally designated No. 32179, and later re-designated No. 36877) was fully briefed and 
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argued before both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, but it was ultimately dismissed 
on the basis that the notice of appeal was not timely from the district court's judgment of 
conviction. See generally State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305 (2010). 
In light of this dismissal, on March 18, 2011, the State stipulated that Mr. Ciccone had 
received ineffective assistance of counsel insofar as his trial counsel had failed to file a timely 
notice of appeal in 2005.3 (See No. 38817 R., pp.16-18.) Pursuant to the parties' stipulation for 
post-conviction relief, on April 19,2011, the district court entered an order vacating its original 
judgment of conviction and re-entering it as of that date. (No. 38817 R., p.19.) 
On April 26, 2011, Mr. Ciccone filed a new notice of appeal, this one timely from the re-
entered judgment of conviction. (No. 38817 R., pp.21-24.) On appeal, Mr. Ciccone presents 
three issues for this Court's consideration: (1) whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct 
during his closing arguments; (2) whether Mr. Ciccone's constitutional and statutory rights to a 
speedy trial were violated; and (3) whether his fixed life sentence is excessive. He respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate his conviction and/or sentence and either: order that the case be 
dismissed based on violations of his speedy trial rights; remand the case for a new trial based on 
the- prosecutor's misconduct; or reduce his fixed life sentence (or remand the case for a new 
sentencing hearing) based on the excessiveness of that sentence. 
3 Mr. Ciccone's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was apparently brought through a 
petition for post-conviction relief. (See No. 38817 R., p.17 ("Petitioner filed a Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief (CV 2009-1196) under Idaho Code § 19-4901 on September 24, 2009 ... 
alleging, in part, the failure of his counsel to timely file the notice of appeal constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel.").) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct by twice commenting on Mr. Ciccone's silence 
and then asking the jury to convict Mr. Ciccone based on sympathy for the victim? 
2. Were Mr. Ciccone's speedy trial rights violated when, on the eve of trial, the district 
court granted the State's motion for a continuance and set Mr. Ciccone's trial out an 
additional six months? 
3. Is Mr. Ciccone's fixed life sentence for first degree murder excessive given any view of 
the facts? 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
Mr. Ciccone Is Entitled To A New Trial Because The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By 
Twice Commenting On Mr. Ciccone's Silence And Once Asking The Jury To Convict Based On 
Its Sympathy For The Victim 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ciccone contends that his right to a fair trial,4 his right to due process oflaw,5 and his 
right to silence,6 were abridged through the prosecutor's closing arguments in this case. There 
are three comments at issue, all of which were made during the rebuttal portion of the 
prosecutor's closing argument. First, while discussing the State's contention that there was an 
altercation between Mr. Ciccone and Kathleen immediately before her death, and speculating 
that during the course of that altercation, Kathleen had thrown her purse at her husband, the 
prosecutor asserted that "[t]here's only two people that know, and Kathleen Ciccone isn't here to 
tell us." (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1853, Ls.21-23.) A short time later, in asking the jury to reject defense 
counsel's argument that Kathleen's death was the result of an accident, the prosecutor argued 
that "[t]here is no testimony" that Mr. Ciccone was distracted or not looking at Kathleen 
4 See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I § 13. 
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I § 13. 
6 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I § 13. 
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immediately prior to striking her with his vehicle. (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1856, Ls.2-9.) Finally, in 
concluding his argument, the prosecutor made the following plea: 
When you kill somebody, you take away everything they have and 
everything they ever will have. Kathleen was 22 years old. Her death is a tragedy. 
Give her life meaning and give her death the sense of justice that it requires. Hold 
the defendant accountable for the purposeful, willful, deliberate, premeditated 
actions that he took that night [sic]. 
(Ir. Vol. VIII, p.l860, Ls.l5-22.) 
Mr. Ciccone contends that the first two statements constituted misconduct because they 
were improper comments on his exercise of the right not to testify. He asserts that the third 
statement was an improper plea for the jury to convict him of the greatest charged offense based 
on matters other than the evidence of his guilt or innocence, specifically, its sympathy for the 
victim. Based on this misconduct, Mr. Ciccone requests that he be granted a new trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because Mr. Ciccone's prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in constitutional 
principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. City of 
Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1,2 (2006). 
C. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct When He Implicitly Asked The Jury To Draw A 
Negative Inference From Mr. Ciccone's Decision Not To Testify 
1. A Prosecutor's Comment On The Defendant's Failure To Testify Constitutes A 
Violation Of The Defendant's Right To Silence 
Pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as 
well as Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, no person may be compelled, in any criminal 
case, to be made a witness against himself. The essence of this mandate, of course, is that, where 
the government "proposes to convict and punish an individual," it must "produce the evidence 
against him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing 
it from his own lips." Culombe v. Connecticut, 357 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961). 
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In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the United States Supreme Court held that 
this Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, made applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids the government from commenting to the jury about the 
defendant's decision not to testify. Id. at 615. In determining whether a prosecutor's argument is 
impermissible in this regard, the court must ask whether the prosecutor "manifestly intended" to 
comment on the defendant's silence, or his argument was of such character that the jury would 
"naturally and necessarily" take that argument as a comment on the defendant's silence. United 
States v. Reyes, 966 F.2d 508, 509 (9th Cir. 1992); State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 232 (1975). 
"Idaho follows the overwhelming number of jurisdictions holding that a prosecutors' 
general references to uncontradicted evidence do not necessarily reflect on the defendant's 
failure to testify, where witnesses other than the defendant could have contradicted the 
evidence." State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312, 314 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis in original).7 
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has recently observed that "[ c ]omment on the absence of 
evidence contradicting the state's case is particularly problematic where the defendant is the sole 
witness who would be able to contradict the evidence in question," and it noted that "courts 
generally hold that such comment in this context is improper." McMurry, 143 Idaho at 315~ 
(emphasis in original). Ultimately, the McMurry Court held that, where the prosecutor repeatedly 
argued that the defense had offered no evidence of self-defense and, specifically, no evidence to 
counter the State's evidence on the self-defense issue, those arguments were improper because 
7 Compare, e.g., State v. Whitaker, _ Idaho _, 2012 WL 182115 *5 (Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2012) (not 
yet final) ("In this case, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider that the victims' testimony was 
'uncontroverted' concerning events that occurred when only Whitaker and one of the girls were 
present. Thus, the prosecutor's comments implicated Whitaker's Fifth Amendment privilege.") 
with State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 590-92 (1983) (holding that a prosecutor's argument that 
the government's expert's opinion was "uncontradicted" was not "an impermissible reference to 
the defendant's failure to testify" since "[t]here was no implication that defendant himself had 
some obligation to take the witness stand (and was admitting guilt by not doing so)"). 
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they went beyond a legitimate rebuttal of the defendant's evidence and "suggested the jury 
should infer guilt from [the defendant's] decision to present evidence without venturing upon the 
witness stand." Id. at 315-16. 
2. Mr. Ciccone's Right To Silence Was Violated When The Prosecutor Twice 
Commented On His Failure To Testify In His Own Defense 
In this case, the prosecutor made two comments during his rebuttal argument which 
Mr. Ciccone contends violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. First, in discussing 
what the State had sought to portray as a physical altercation between Mr. Ciccone and Kathleen8 
immediately before she walked off and was struck and killed by Mr. Ciccone's vehicle, the 
prosecutor, after suggesting that Kathleen may have thrown her purse at her husband during this 
altercation, asserted as follows: "There's only two people that know, and Kathleen Ciccone isn't 
here to tell us." (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.l853, Ls.3-23.) A short time later, while arguing that 
Mr. Ciccone intentionally struck his wife, and that the jury should reject defense counsel's 
"accident" theory, argued as follows: 
There is no testimony that he was looking down at his watch, that the 
cigarette smoke had blown in his face, that he was changing the radio station, that 
a cassette dropped, a cigarette dropped in his pants, he had to try and put it out 
real quick No testimony as to that. Absolutely none. He doesn't say anything 
about any-
(Tr. Vol. VIII, p.l856, Ls.2-9.) 
Mr. Ciccone contends that both of the prosecutor's arguments were comments on his 
silence because he is the only one who could have told the jury the circumstances of his 
argument with Kathleen, and he is the only one who could have offered "testimony" to explain 
how it was that he was unable to avoid hitting his wife with his vehicle. See McMurry, 143 Idaho 
8 Mr. Ciccone has described this dispute as "an argument," not a physical fight, although he does 
concede that Kathleen "threw the food" that she had in her possession. (PSI, p.11.) 
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at 315-16; Whitaker, 2012 WL 182115 at *5. Under Griffin and its progeny, therefore, those 
comments violated Mr. Ciccone's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to silence. 
3. A Prosecutorial Comment On Silence Is A Fundamental Error Which Can Be 
Raised For The First Time On Appeal And, In This Case, The Comments On 
Mr. Ciccone's Silence Were So Prejudicial As To Warrant A New Trial 
Mr. Ciccone concedes that the first comment on his silence was not objected to by trial 
counsel (see Tr. Vol. VIII, p.l853, L.8 - p.1854, L.6); the district court sustained his counsel's 
objection to the second comment on his silence (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1856, Ls.2-11); and, at the close 
of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument, the district court admonished the jury to "disregard any 
argument based upon what the defendant did not say," and it re-read Jury Instruction No. 55 
(ICJI 301), which had apprised the jury of Mr. Ciccone's constitutional right not to testify 
(Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1860, L.24 - p.1861, L.11). Nevertheless, Mr. Ciccone contends that he can 
seek a new trial on appeal because the prosecutor's arguments met the test for fundamental error 
and were so prejudicial that, the district court's remedial measures notwithstanding, he was 
denied a fair trial. 
a) A Comment On The Defendant's Silence Constitutes A Fundamental 
Error, Which Can Be Considered On Appeal Despite The Absence Of A 
Contemporaneous Objection 
Generally, in the absence of a contemporaneous objection by trial counsel, the defendant 
may not be heard to complain about a trial error on appeal. State v. Peny, 150 Idaho 209, 224 
(2010). However, an appellant may obtain appellate relief for an unobjected to "fundamental" 
error under the following conditions: 
(I) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without 
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate recont 
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; 
and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's 
substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the 
outcome of the trial proceedings. 
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Id. at 226 (footnote omitted). Mr. Ciccone submits that the prosecutor's first comment on his 
silence satisfies this standard and, therefore, relief can be granted even though trial counsel failed 
to make a timely objection. 
First, the error complained of-a prosecutorial comment on Mr. Ciccone's silence-is 
undoubtedly a violation of an unwaived constitutional right. As discussed above, such a 
comment is a violation of Mr. Ciccone's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to silence. 
Second, the error is clear and obvious. Not only is the error plain as a legal matter, see McMurry, 
143 Idaho at 315-16, but it is obvious that trial counsel's failure to object was not any sort of 
tactical decision (see Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1856, L.l 0 (defense counsel objecting to the prosecutor's 
second comment on Mr. Ciccone's silence)). Third, the prosecutor's comment on Mr. Ciccone's 
silence was clearly prejudicial for the reasons discussed below. 
b) The Prosecutor's Comments On Mr. Ciccone's Silence Were Unduly 
Prejudicial 
Admittedly, when the prosecutor made his second improper comment on Mr. Ciccone's 
silence, district court sustained a defense objection (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1856, Ls.2-11) and, later, the 
district court not only instructed the jury to "disregard any argument based upon what the 
defendant did not say," but also reiterated its Instruction 55 (the pattern instruction concerning 
the defendant's exercise of his right not to testify). Nevertheless, Mr. Ciccone submits that the 
prosecutor's improper comments were so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. 
First, it is beyond cavil that comments on silence are inherently prejudicial. See generally 
Griffin, 380 U.S. 609. 
Second, in this case, there were two separate comments on Mr. Ciccone's silence, each of 
which would have compounded the prejudice caused by the other. See McMurry, 143 Idaho at 
316 (citing, with approval, authorities noting that multiple improper comments not only tend to 
reinforce one another, but also diminish the curative effect of the trial court's instructions). 
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Third, the district court's "curative" instructions did not necessarily cure the errors. Prior 
to the Idaho Supreme Court's reformulation of the "fundamental error" standard in Perry, supra, 
the relevant inquiry for determining whether unobjected to prosecutorial misconduct in closing 
arguments could be considered on appeal in the absence of a contemporaneous objection was 
whether "the comments were so egregious and/or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice 
could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the 
comments should be disregarded." State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 565 (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting 
State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891,898 (1990)). In State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575 (Ct. App. 2005), the 
Court of Appeals held that that the prosecutor's comments on the defendant's silence met this 
standard, such that they could be considered on appeal even in the absence of an objection. ld. at 
577. By so holding, the Court of Appeals implicitly found that prosecutorial comments on the 
defendant's silence may be so prejudicial that even a curative instruction is insufficient to cure 
the error.9 See id. Mr. Ciccone submits that this is just such a case. 
Fourth, the fact is that this was a close case. There was no direct evidence that 
Mr. Ciccone struck and killed his wife intentionally; at the same time, there was plenty of 
evidence from which the jury could have inferred that he struck his wife accidentally. Thus, in 
the absence of the prosecutor's improper comments on Mr. Ciccone's silence, the jury could 
have very easily found him guilty of anyone of the myriad of lesser-included offenses for which 
it had been instructed (second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, 
or vehicular manslaughter). 
9 Although the fundamental error standard employed in cases such as Cortez and Smith has since 
been replaced by the Perry standard, the Lopez Court's conclusion that prosecutorial comments 
on the defendant's silence may be so egregious and inflammatory that a curative instruction is 
inadequate to remedy the misconduct and preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial is still 
sound. 
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In light of all of this, Mr. Ciccone submits that the prosecutor's two comments on his 
exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify were prejudicial and, thus, warrant a new 
trial. 
D. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct When He Asked The Jurors To Convict 
Mr. Ciccone Based On Their Sympathy For The Victim 
Even where prosecutorial arguments do not directly infringe upon rights specifically 
guaranteed by the Constitution (such as the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination) those arguments may nevertheless violate the United States Constitution by 
rendering the defendant's trial unfair. Donnelly v. De Christoforo , 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). 
Moreover, the Idaho courts have long-recognized that, given the unique position of authority and 
trust occupied by prosecutors, they have an overarching duty to do justice and, thus, avoid using 
unnecessarily inflammatory tactics. See, e.g., State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 (1993); 
State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166 (1980), overruled on other grounds by State v. LePage, 102 
Idaho 387 (1981); State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 353-55 (1973). Indeed, more than 100 years 
ago, the Idaho Supreme Court explained as follows: 
"A prosecuting attorney is a public officer, 'acting in a quasi judicial 
capacity.' It is his duty to use all fair, honorable, rea_sonable, and lawful means to 
secure the conviction of the guilty who are or may be indicted in the courts of his 
judicial circuit. He should see that they have a fair and impartial trial, and avoid 
convictions contrary to law. Nothing should tempt him to appeal to prejudices, to 
pervert the testimony, or make statements to the jury, which, whether true or not, 
have not been proved. The desire for success should never induce him to endeavor 
to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything except the evidence in the 
case, and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the 
same. To convict and punish a person through the influence of prejudice and 
caprice is as pernicious in its consequences as the escape of a guilty man. The 
forms oflaw should never be prostituted to such a purpose." [Holder v. State, 25 
S.W. 279 (1894).] ... 
It will be observed from the foregoing authorities that the courts do not 
look with favor upon the action of prosecutors in going beyond any possible state 
of facts which can be material as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant in a 
particular case for which he is upon trial. Prosecutors too often forget that they are 
a part of the machinery of the court, and that they occupy an official position, 
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which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their statements, action, 
and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will 
give to counsel for the accused. It seems that they frequently exert their skill and 
ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally 
in so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused. It is the duty of the 
prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent 
evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he should guard against 
anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and tend to hinder them 
from considering only the evidence introduced. 
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44 (1903) (quoted with approval in State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 
87 (Ct. App. 2007)). 
One hundred and two years after Irwin was decided, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
used similar reasoning to explain why inflammatory emotional pleas are improper: 
A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order to 
protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking. The 
evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the defendant will be convicted 
for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or innocence. Jurors may be 
persuaded by such appeals to believe that, convicting a defendant, they will assist 
in the solution of some pressing social problem. The amelioration of society'S 
woes is far too heavy a burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear. 
United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 
Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 
1441 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). In Weatherspoon, a case in which the defendant was charged with being 
a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, portions of the prosecutor's closing argument 
focused on the personal comfort and community safety which is attendant to taking armed ex-
cons off the streets. Id. at 1149. The Ninth Circuit held that, "[t]hat entire line of argument ... 
was improper." Id. Then, after quoting the above language from Koon and Monaghan, it 
observed that since Mr. Weatherspoon's case turned solely on the question of whether he had, in 
fact, been in possession of a firearm on the night in question, the prosecutor's arguments about 
the "potential social ramifications of the jury's reaching a guilty verdict," were "irrelevant and 
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improper" because "[t]hey were clearly designed to encourage the jury to enter a verdict on the 
basis of emotion rather than fact." Id. at 1149-1150. 
In light of the foregoing, it is now well-recognized that prosecutors may not utilize 
emotional appeals-whether they be appeals to sympathy, fear, anger, or any other emotions-in 
their closing arguments to juries. See, e.g., State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719-20 (2009) 
(finding prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor's closing argument referenced the victim 
"speaking from her grave," and "arguab[ e]" misconduct where the prosecutor painted a picture 
of loss by the victim's family); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding 
prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor's closing argument asked the jurors to imagine 
themselves to be hypothetical victims of the defendant's drunk driving); State v. Beebe, 145 
Idaho 570, 575-76 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor's 
closing argument highlighted concerns about the protection of the public at-large, as well as 
concerns for the rights of victims); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Here, ... 
the prosecutor's appeal to the jurors' emotions was overt and express, conveying not simply that 
the witness's testimony was implausible or lacking credibility, but that jurors ought to respond to 
the testimony with irritation and resentment. Such appeals to emotioD- during closing argument 
are plainly improper."); State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 367 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[T]he prosecutor's 
statement was an improper reference to the jurors' families and hypothesized the commission of 
a crime against them .... This type of hypothesis is an appeal to jurors' fears, not a "fact" proven 
by the evidence nor a reasonable inference based upon the evidence. Therefore it is not a proper 
consideration for the jury's decision or for counsel's argument."); State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 
656-57 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor argued that "the 
entire criminal justice system" was on trial and that the jury was "the only thing standing 
between the people of this community and [the defendant] robbing or doing anything else he 
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chooses to anyone else in the community"). Cj, e.g., State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, _, 253 
P.3d 727, 735-37 (finding misconduct in prosecutor's questions eliciting irrelevant testimony 
about how the facts of the case were so disturbing that they caused the State's expert to change 
jobs, and in unnecessarily making repetitious use of certain inflammatory phraseology in 
questioning another witness); State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 819 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting that it is 
improper for a prosecutor to ask a question of an alleged victim in order to generate sympathy 
for that person). 
As noted above, in this case, the prosecutor concluded his closing argument with the 
following remarks: 
When you kill somebody, you take away everything they have and 
everything they ever will have. Kathleen was 22 years old. Her death is a tragedy. 
Give her life meaning and give her death the sense of justice that it requires. Hold 
the defendant accountable for the purposeful, willful, deliberate, premeditated 
actions that he took that night [sic]. 
(Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1860, Ls.l5-22.) Those remarks were plainly improper because they asked the 
jury to convict Mr. Ciccone for a reason wholly irrelevant to his actual guilt or innocence-its 
sympathy for the deceased victim. Since Mr. Ciccone had never denied that he was the one who 
had taken his wife's life. the prosecutor's focus on everything that had been lost when Kathleen 
died, and the sheer tragedy of her death, was an unabashed plea for the jury to convict 
Mr. Ciccone of the greatest charge, first degree murder, based on its sympathy for the victim. 
Although the prosecutor's argument in this regard is plain enough, he was even more explicit in 
his appeal to the emotions of the jurors when he openly implored the jury to find Mr. Ciccone 
guilty of first degree murder to "[g]ive her life meaning and give her death the sense of justice 
that it requires." 
Although Mr. Ciccone's trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's plea to convict his 
client based on its sympathy for the victim, the lack of objection is no bar to his raising this issue 
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on appeal. As noted, a defendant may obtain appellate relief for an unobjected to "fundamental" 
error under the following conditions: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without 
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, 
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; 
and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's 
substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the 
outcome of the trial proceedings. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 (footnote omitted). As with the prosecutor's comments on Mr. Ciccone's 
exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, the prosecutor's improper emotional appeals 
satisfy this standard. 
First, as noted, the Mr. Ciccone's misconduct claim is grounded in his right to due 
process and a fair trial. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643. Thus, insofar as the prosecutor made 
improper emotional appeals depriving him of a fair trial, i.e., a determination of guilt or 
innocence based solely on the evidence, Mr. Ciccone has shown a violation of an unwaived 
constitutional right. 
Second, as it is now well-established that a prosecutor may not ask a jury to convict 
based on matters outside the evidence. See, e.g., Irwin, 9 Idaho at 43-44 (observing, well over 
100 years ago, that "[n]othing should tempt" a prosecutor "to appeal to prejudices" of the jurors, 
or "to endeavor to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything except the evidence in the 
case, and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the same" because 
"[t]o convict and punish a person through the influence of prejudice and caprice is as pernicious 
in its consequences as the escape of a guilty man"). 
Third, the prosecutor's misconduct in this regard was highly prejudicial. As noted, this 
was a close case where the jury's finding of an intentional killing was far from a foregone 
conclusion, and where a guilty verdict on lesser offenses, or even an outright acquittal, was 
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certainly possible. Furthermore, the prejudice attendant to the prosecutor's misconduct in 
appealing to the sympathies of the jurors would have been exacerbated by his misconduct in 
commenting on Mr. Ciccone's silence. Taken together, these instances of misconduct rendered it 
impossible for Mr. Ciccone to receive a truly fair trial. 
In light of the foregoing, not only should this Court reach Mr. Ciccone's claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct for appealing to the jurors' sympathies, but it should find that that 
claim necessitates a new trial. 
II. 
Mr. Ciccone's Statutory And Constitutional Rights To A Speedy Trial Were Violated When The 
District Court Granted The State's Motion For A Continuance And Pushed His Trial Back By 
Almost Six Months 
A. Introduction 
As discussed above, Mr. Ciccone's trial was originally set to begin on July 20,2004, 
which was more than nine months (278 days) after his October 16, 2003 arrest, and almost six 
months (175 days) after the Information was filed (on January 27,2004). However, on the eve of 
trial, the State moved for a continuance. That motion was ultimately granted (over a defense 
objection), and the district court re-set Mr. Ciccone's trial for January 4,2005, which represented 
a date that was almost fifteen months (446 days) after his arrest, and almost a full year (343 
days) after the filing of the Information. Prior to the re-scheduled trial, Mr. Ciccone filed a 
motion to have the case dismissed based on violations of his statutory and constitutional right to 
a speedy trial, but that motion was denied by the district court and his case proceeded to trial on 
January 4,2005. 
As set forth below, by granting the State's motion for a continuance and allowing 
Mr. Ciccone to be tried almost fifteen months after his arrest and almost a full year after the 
filing of the Information, the district court violated Mr. Ciccone's statutory and constitutional 
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rights to a speedy trial. As a result, Mr. Ciccone's conviction and sentence should be vacated and 
his case should be dismissed with prejudice. 
B. The District Court Violated Mr. Ciccone's Right To A Speedy Trial As Guaranteed By 
The United States And Idaho Constitutions 
The United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United States Supreme Court recognized that the "speedy" trial 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is a "more vague concept than other procedural rights," and 
that what is considered "speedy" will vary from case to case, depending on the unique facts of 
each. Id. at 521-30. Thus, the Barker Court adopted an ad hoc approach, taking into 
consideration four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason(s) for the delay; (3) the 
defendant's assertion(s) of his right; and (4) the prejudice suffered by the defendant owing to the 
delay.ld. at 530-33. With regard to the balancing of these four factors, the Court held as follows: 
"We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition 
to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors that 
must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Id. at 533. 
The Idaho Constitution contains a virtually identical speedy trial guarantee. IDAHO 
CONST. art I § 13. Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the same four-factored test 
for evaluating speedy trial claims under the Idaho Constitution as the United States Supreme 
Court has applied for evaluating speedy trial claims under the United States Constitution. 1o 
State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117 (2001). 
10 Although the right to a speedy trial under the Idaho Constitution is not necessarily identical to 
the right to a speedy trial under the United States Constitution, State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 
836 (Ct. App. 2005), the only difference identified thus far is the starting point for measuring the 
period of delay. According to the Young Court: 
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As set forth in detail below, under the Barker test, this Court should find that 
Mr. Ciccone's speedy trial rights (under both the Idaho Constitution and United States 
Constitution) were violated. 
1. The Length Of The Delay Is Presumptively Prejudicial 
The threshold factor to be considered pursuant to Barker is the length of delay. With 
regard to this factor, the United States Supreme Court has held as follows: 
The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is 
some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry 
into the other factors that go in the balance. Nevertheless, because of the 
imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such 
an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31. 
As noted, Mr. Ciccone was arrested on October 16, 2003, but was not tried until 
January 4, 2005, a delay of nearly fifteen months (446 days). This delay ought to be sufficient to 
"trigger" further inquiry because, as the United States Supreme Court has observed, 
"[ d]epending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found postaccusation 
delay 'presumptively prejudicial' at least as it approaches one year." Doggett v. United States, 
505 U.S. 647,. 652 n.l (1992) (emphasis added). The Court's observation appears to be consistent 
with Idaho precedent, as our courts tend to indulge full Barker inquiries, not only with trial 
delays around a year or a year and one-half, but sometimes even with trial delays as short as nine 
Under the Sixth Amendment, the period of delay is measured from the date there 
is "a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by 
arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge." United States v. Marion, 404 
U.S. 307,320,92 S. Ct. 455,463,30 L. Ed. 2d 468, 479 (1971). Under the Idaho 
Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date formal charges are 
filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first. 
Young, 136 Idaho at 117. However, this distinction is not material to the present appeal because 
Mr. Ciccone was arrested on October 16, 2003, thus "starting the clock" on the speedy trial issue 
for purposes of both the Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution. 
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months. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 582-83 (Ct. App. 1999) (implicitly finding 
a delay of nine months to be sufficient to trigger a full inquiry under Barker); State v. Reutzel, 
130 Idaho 88, 94 (Ct. App. 1997) (same); State v. Wavrick, 123 Idaho 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding that a delay of less than sixteen months is sufficient to trigger a full inquiry); State v. 
Talmage, 104 Idaho 249, 252 (1983) (holding that a delay of seven and one-half months is 
sufficient to trigger a full inquiry); State v. Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474 (1975) (holding that a delay of 
fourteen months is sufficient to trigger a full inquiry). Perhaps this is because Idaho has a statute, 
the predecessor of which pre-dates statehood, that evidences the Idaho Legislature's belief that a 
delay of six months is simply too long to wait to try a defendant in the average case. See 
I.e. § 19-3501 (providing that, unless "good cause" is shown, if the defendant is not tried within 
six months from the filing of the information or the defendant's arraignment following 
indictment, the case against him must be dismissed); State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257-58 
(2000) (discussing the history of I.C. § 19-3501).11 
2. The Reasons For The Delay, Taken As A Whole, Do Not Justify The Delay 
The second factor to be considered is the reason for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-
32. 
Initially, Mr. Ciccone concedes that he cannot now reap a benefit (in terms of the 
bolstering of his speedy trial claim) based on delays that are attributable to him. See United 
States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316-17 (1986); State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 838-39 
(Ct. App. 2005). Accordingly, Mr. Ciccone does not now complain about those delays occurring 
during the preliminary hearing stage of his case to which he contributed. As noted above, 
Mr. Ciccone's preliminary hearing was a protracted, piecemeal proceeding, beginning on 
11 Mr. Ciccone analyzes I.C. § 19-3501 in some detail below, as that provision underlies his 
claim that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial. 
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October 30, 2003, and not ending until January 12,2004. On the first day of that hearing, defense 
counsel stipulated to the State's request to call only two witnesses and continue the balance of 
the hearing on another day. (Tr. Vol. II, p.l7, L.20 - p.23, L.15.) At that point, the preliminary 
hearing was recessed for almost three weeks, until November 19,2003. On November 19,2003, 
because of concerns about Mr. Ciccone's competency, defense counsel successfully moved for a 
second continuance to an unspecified date. (Tr. Vol. II, p.79, L.14 - p.85, L.16.) The preliminary 
hearing then resumed on December 15,2003. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.86, L.l-p.164, L.23.) 
Accordingly, Mr. Ciccone does not seek to charge the State with the delays occurring between 
October 30, 2003 and December 15,2003, a period of approximately a month and half (46 days). 
However, he contends that the State is responsible for the remaining fourteen-month (400-day) 
delay. 
The Barker Court held that, with respect to the delays attributable to the government: 
[D]ifferent weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt 
to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against 
the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts 
should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the 
ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government 
rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, 
should serve to justify appropriate delay. 
Barker, 407 U.S. 531. In this case, Mr. Ciccone does not contend that the State ever deliberately 
delayed the case in order to hamper the defense; however, he contends that because all of the 
remaining 400-day delay is attributable to the State and, therefore, must be weighed against the 
State, his speedy trial rights were violated. 
As discussed above, the greatest trial delay occurred when, on the eve of trial, the State 
filed a motion seeking a continuance of the trial date. (R., pp.l 02-06.) The primary basis for its 
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request was that numerous "material,,12 prosecution witnesses were "TDY" and, therefore, 
"unavailable" (R., pp.l02-05); but it also asserted that the defense had failed to turn over the 
curriculum vitae of one of the expert witnesses it had disclosed (R., pp.! 05-06). At the hearing 
on the State's motion, its claimed reasons for seeking a continuance expanded to include the 
following: (a) the trial likely could not be completed in the time originally allotted (Tr. Vol. VII, 
p.16, L.24 - p.19, L.9); and (b) one or two additional witnesses would be "unavailable," although 
not for "TDY" reasons. Ultimately, after cautioning the prosecutor that the State was creating an 
appealable issue for Mr. Ciccone, the district court granted the State's motion and continued 
Mr. Ciccone's trial until January 2005 (nearly six months later) because that was "the first 
available date when two weeks would be available on the court's calendar." (Tr. Vol. VII, p.25, 
L.25 - p.32, L.8.) For the reasons set forth below, none of the reasons proffered by the State, or 
the district court, constitute "valid reasons" that might immunize the government from 
responsibility for the 400-day delay in bringing Mr. Ciccone to trial. 
a) The State Failed To Demonstrate That The Witnesses On TDY (Or Its 
Functional Equivalent) Were "Unavailable" 
While the Barker Court noted that a "missing witness" IS a valid reason for the 
government to delay the defendant's trial, Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
has made it clear that "there is an enormous difference between [a witness] being inconvenienced 
and being unavailable. True unavailability suggests an unqualified inability to attend, while 
inconvenience merely implies that attendance at trial would be burdensome." State v. Davis, 141 
Idaho 828, 837 (Ct. App. 2005). If the State can show only that the witness would be 
12 Of the eight supposedly "material" witnesses identified by the State (seven were identified in 
the State's written motion (see R., pp.l 03-05), and one more was identified at the hearing on the 
motion (see Tr. Vol. VII, p.17, L.I0 -p.l8, L.l)), even after the State obtained the continuance it 
sought, it only presented testimony from three (Alan Roberts, Dr. Timothy Ruth, and Steve 
Brown). 
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inconvenienced, it fails to show a valid reason for delay and the delay must be weighed against 
the State. See id. Moreover, where a witness cannot be located because the State was negligent in 
failing to take steps to secure that witness' attendance at trial, Barker itself suggests that the 
witness is not "missing" and, thus, there is no valid reason for delay and the delay must be 
weighed against the government. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; cf Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53 
(weighing the delay against the government where the government was dilatory in locating the 
defendant). 
In this case, the State's written motion for a continuance named seven "material" 
witnesses, six of whom (Mike Almond, Jeremy Christianson, Jason Delion, Michael Pfirmann, 
Dr. Timothy Ruth, and Steve Brown), it claimed were on TDY (or some sort of equivalent 
military assignment)13 and could not attend Mr. Ciccone's July 2004 trial. (See R., pp.102-05.) 
However, the State's motion also reveals that the State never knew of these individuals,14 or 
attempted to track them down or subpoena them until "the end of June" 2004, after receiving the 
report detailing the Air Force's own investigation of Mr. Ciccone's case. (R., p.102; see also 
Ir. Vol. VII, p.8, L.16 - p.l3, L.14.) In other words, the State admitted that rather than 
conducting its own investigation into Mr. Ciccone's case in the nine months since Mr. Ciccone'-s 
arrest, it sat by and waited for the Air Force to conduct an investigation, all the while hoping to 
piggyback off of the Air Force's work. And when that lackadaisical approach did not pan out, the 
13 Only four of the witnesses were explicitly identified as being on TDY; however, two others 
were involved in some other sort of military service, according to the State. (See R., pp.1 03-04.) 
14 At the hearing on the State's motion, defense counsel questioned the veracity of the claim that 
most of the witnesses in question had been unknown to the State until late June 2004. (See 
Tr. Vol. VII, p.l9, L.24 - p.20, L.23.) Indeed, if "[t]he names of most of the witnesses were not 
disclosed to the State because of military procedures until the end of June" (R., p.102), as the 
State claimed, it is difficult to image how they could have so quickly become "material" 
witnesses in a case that the State should have been investigating for the preceding nine months. 
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State sought a continuance to make up for lost time. However, laziness or the desire to save on 
investigative costs is not a valid reason for delay; it is more akin to the negligence that the 
Barker Court made clear must count against the government. 
Moreover, although the State argued that six of its witnesses were on TDY or its 
functional equivalent, it never showed that those witnesses were truly unavailable in the sense 
that it was impossible for them to have come back to Idaho to testify. "It cannot be assumed that 
the military would have refused the People's request to allow the witness to travel back to New 
York [for the defendant's trial] .... No legal preswnption exists allowing the People to establish 
that a soldier stationed overseas will not be permitted by the military to travel back to the United 
States to testify at a criminal trial." People v. Chardon, 2005 WL 2866923 *4 (N.Y. S. Ct. 2005) 
(unpublished opinion). Indeed, there is no reason to believe that a serviceman temporarily 
stationed out of state could not be compelled to return to the State of Idaho through issuance of 
an appropriate subpoena or warrant, or that, in the interest of comity, the United States military 
would not allow its servicemen to return to Idaho. Quite to the contrary, the State's own 
arguments in favor of a continuance suggest that the witnesses' attendance may very well have 
been secured had it acted in a timely fashion. (See, e.g., R VoL L pp.l07-08 ("[T}he State ... 
has witnesses who are unavailable because of temporary assignments out of the state and as such 
all subpoena's [sic] must go through the military chain of command to get them back to Idaho to 
testify."); Tr. Vol. VII, p.13, Ls.3-8 ("IfI am going to be able to send [subpoenas] to them, then I 
have to get not only an out of state court to serve them, lawfully serve them, but in a case where 
they are in South Korea, we would have to go through the Federal Court system to even get those 
served over there.").) 
The reality is that the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the witnesses 
at issue were truly "unavailable." To show true unavailability, the State must show that, despite 
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its diligent efforts, it was unable to secure the presence of the relevant witnesses. In Chardon, for 
example, the Kings County Supreme Court in New York noted that where the government's 
witness was a serviceman believed to be stationed in Korea, but the government had failed to 
show diligent efforts initially in obtaining his presence for the defendant's trial (because it never 
attempted to contact him directly, attempt to obtain his address, make contact with other military 
officials to confirm that his duty station was, in fact, Korea, or request that he be permitted to 
travel to the United States), the government had failed to prove that the witness was truly 
unavailable such that the delay owing to the witness's absence during that period would be 
weighed against the government. Chardon, 2005 WL 2866923 at *3-6. Just as was the case in 
the above-referenced portion of Chardon, here, the State has utterly failed to show that it made 
diligent efforts to obtain the attendance of the witnesses in question. 
b) The State Failed To Demonstrate That The Witness(es) Not On TDY 
Was/Were "Unavailable" 
In its written motion, the State mentioned one witness discovered through the Air Force 
investigation-a retired gentleman (Robert Reagan) who had been Mr. Ciccone's supervisor 
back in October of 2003-who, despite its claimed unspecified "[ d]iligent efforts," it could not 
locate. (R., p.104.) However, as argued above, the State has demonstrated negligence rather than 
diligence in waiting for the Air Force report before attempting to speak with a supposedly-
material witness. In addition, the State has failed to establish that its efforts have, in fact, been 
diligent simply by offering the conclusory assertion that, in its view, it has been diligent. 
Accordingly, this Court cannot conclude that the State met its burden of demonstrating that 
Mr. Reagan was truly unavailable such that the State had a valid reason for a continuance. 
Likewise, the State failed to establish that Alan Roberts, the witness identified for the 
first time at the hearing on the State's motion, was truly unavailable since he had simply flown 
out of town to spend time with his ailing mother and, in fact, would have been back by July 28, 
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2004. (Tr. Vol. VII, p.17, L.19 - p.18, L.l.) At most, attendance at Mr. Ciccone's trial in July of 
2004 would have been an inconvenience to Mr. Roberts, but even that is in question since he was 
scheduled to be back to Idaho while the trial was still going on. Accordingly, this Court cannot 
conclude that the State met its burden of showing that Mr. Roberts was truly unavailable so as to 
warrant a continuance. 
c) Defense Counsel's Less-Than-Immediate Disclosure Of The Defense 
Expert's Curriculum Vitae Was Not A Valid Reason For Delaying Trial 
Another reason that the State offered in support for its motion for a continuance was that 
on June 18,2004 (orally) and on June 27, 2004 (in writing), the defense had disclosed the name 
of one of its possible expert witnesses, Brent Freeman, but that, despite requests from the State 
on July 6, 2004 and July 7, 2004, the defense had not furnished a curriculum vitae until July 16, 
2004. (R., pp.l05-05; Tr. Vol. VII, p.156, L.9 - p.16, L.22.) The State argued that Mr. Freeman's 
curriculum vitae was critical to the prosecution's ability to cross-examine him for the following 
reasons: 
He is not going to have a report. One of the only areas the State can do 
[sic] is to challenge his credentials. And looking over his curriculum vitae that I 
received Friday afternoon in making some preliminary inquiries, there already 
appears to be some inconsistencies on what he is claiming is his expertise versus 
what he has been actually trained by the Idaho State Police to do. 
I am not suggesting he hasn't got it elsewhere. But the State is going to 
have to get more information from that curriculum vitae as to where he has been 
an instructor, where he took the instructor's course of an accident 
reconstructionist, what cases he has actually been an expert on, et cetera. None of 
them are listed in there. 
So, we got that Friday before trial .... 
(Tr. Vol. VIII, p.16, Ls.7-22.) 
There are a host of flaws, however, III the State's argument. First, the State never 
demonstrated that it was entitled to Mr. Freeman's curriculum vitae. The State did not direct the 
district court to any rule or court order that would have required Mr. Ciccone to turn over the 
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curriculum vitae at all. Second, the State never demonstrated that it was entitled to 
Mr. Freeman's curriculum vitae within any particular timeframe. Again, the State did not direct 
the district court to any rule or court order that would have required Mr. Ciccone to turn over the 
curriculum vitae any time prior to July 16, 2004. Third, the State's claims regarding the risk of 
prejudice were overblown. Because Mr. Freeman's name was disclosed more than a month prior 
to trial and, as it turns out, Mr. Freeman is a former Idaho police officer who had been trained in 
accident reconstruction by the Idaho State Police and, specifically, Trooper Fred Rice, the State's 
accident reconstruction expert in this case (see Tr. Vol. VII, p.16, Ls.13-14; Tr. Vol. VIII, 
p.1577, LsA-25, p.l622, Ls.5-l4), and at the time of Mr. Ciccone's trial was also on retainer 
with the State of Idaho to provide expert accident reconstruction assistance in two civil cases 
(see Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1579, L.2l - p.1580, L.9), there was virtually no risk that the State would 
not be able to learn all that it could ever want to learn about Mr. Freeman with just a few short 
phone calls. Fourth, the fact that Mr. Freeman's curriculum vitae was disclosed only four days 
before jury selection was to begin was really of no consequence since he would not be testifying 
until after the State rested its case-in-chief and, therefore, the State would have likely had seven 
or more additional days to investigate his credentials. Fifth, even if the State was somehow put at 
risk of prejudice by the relatively late disclosure of Mr. Freeman's curriculum vitae, a six-month 
continuance was wholly unnecessary. 
d) The Fact That The Prosecutor Underestimated The Length Of The State's 
Case Was Not A Valid Reason For Delaying Trial 
Another justification for the continuance requested by the State was its claim that the 
time scheduled for trial was simply not sufficient: 
[W]e both, defense counsel and I, understood two week trial time. For 
whatever reason, and I know the court did advise us that you would be gone the 
first week of August. I don't think it dawned on either of us or at least me. And I 
talked to Mr. Ratliff a couple weeks ago and he said he had a day and a half of 
rebuttal testimony, which would give the State Friday [July 23, 2004], Monday 
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[July 26,2004], Tuesday [July 27, 2004] to try and get the case-to get its case in 
chief done. 
I gave the court a witness list of approximately 59 to 60 witnesses. And 
rereading that witness list this weekend, I could probably do it with 35 witnesses. 
Eight of which, seven of which, I guess, are now TDY. So, I would be down to 
about 24, 25 witnesses. Two of those witnesses are wholly unavailable until July 
27th or back from trips on July 27th. That means I would be presenting evidence 
on the 28th. 
That's trying a two count first degree murder charge in basically five court 
days, including openings and closings. And I assume we are either going to have 
to have the jury verdict on [Friday] the 30th [of July] or if the court has made 
arrangement through the Supreme Court to have another District Judge to pre-
approve to handle taking the jury verdict. 
So it is the State's opinion in a two-week trial of this magnitude and this 
nature, it probably is two weeks. That's two full weeks of actual testimony. And I 
apologize because I know the court was going to leave by [Friday] July 30th. It 
never dawned on me exactly what the court was saying there. And I don't think it 
did on Mr. Ratliff because we were talking about it we [sic] both kind of making 
the same inferences. A day and a half of his time. 
I have to have some rebuttal time, especially if he has got an expert 
witness that is going to come up and say my accident reconstructionist is full of 
bunk .... So, our-we are going to have to have at least some rebuttal on that 
sole issue. 
Without knowing whether or not the defendant is going to be called. And 
other witnesses that Mr. Ratliff-because he said the entire State's witnesses 
[sic]. That's 55 people. Without knowing who he is going to calling [sic] on 
rebuttal, probably is going to take a day to day and a half. 
(Tr. Vol. VII, p.l6, L.25 - p.19, L.9.) 
Ultimately, the district court found this scheduling snafu compelling. However, rather 
than weighing the error against the goverrnnent, the district court seems to have erroneously 
blamed both parties, as it seems to have found that: both parties had assured the district court 
that Mr. Ciccone's trial could be completed by July 30, 2004; both parties had underestimated 
the length of trial; and, on the eve of trial, both parties sought more time than had originally been 
allotted for their respective presentations of evidence. (See Tr. Vol. VII, p.28, Ls.9-25.) 
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In fact though, the blame for this scheduling error falls squarely on the State and/or the 
district court since defense counsel specifically forewarned the district court that his client's trial 
might extend into early August 2004, and there is no evidence to suggest that defense counsel 
had underestimated the length of his own case. Indeed, at the arraignment/scheduling hearing of 
February 2, 2004, defense counsel specifically proposed a day and one-half for jury selection 
(half of Tuesday, July 20,2004, and all of Wednesday, July 21,2004) and five to seven days for 
the presentation of evidence (Friday July 23, 2004 through Friday, July 30, 2004, excluding 
Thursday, July 29, 2004, but perhaps extending as late as August 3, 2004). (Tr. Vol. VI, pA, 
L.11 - p.9, L.11.) At that time, the State never questioned the five to seven days proposed by 
defense counsel for the presentation of evidence and it certainly never said anything about eight 
and one-half days just to present its own evidence. (See Tr. Vol. VI, pA, L.11 - p.9, L.11.) 
Moreover, the district court never said anything about taking a trip and having to have a verdict 
by July 30,2004. (See Tr. Vol. VI, pA, L.ll - p.9, L.11.) Notably, the district court's scheduling 
order, issued only three days after the scheduling hearing, contained the notation "(2 weeks)" 
right after the trial date. (See R., p.66.) 
In light of the foregoing, it very much appears that the prosecutor reevaluated his case 
and determined he needed more time, and the district judge, for some reason, made plans to 
leave for a trip on July 30, 2004-a day on which he was scheduled to be in trial on 
Mr. Ciccone's case. (See Tr. Vol. VII, p.17, Ls.2-3 ("I know the court did advise us that you 
would be gone the first week of August."), p.18, LsA-9 ("I assume we are either going to have to 
have the jury verdict on the 30th or if the court has made arrangements through the Supreme 
Court to have another District Judge to pre-approve to handle taking the jury verdict. "), p.18, 
Ls.13-14 ("I know the court was going to leave by July 30th.") The reality is that defense 
counsel never enlarged his estimate for the length of trial except to account for the State's 
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enlarged estimate. (See Tr. Vol. VII, p.33, L.14.) Indeed, even after the district court granted the 
State's motion for a continuance, defense counsel indicated that he would need only one and 
one-half days to present the defense case. (Tr. Vol. VII, p.36, Ls.5-7.) Accordingly, this 
particular reason for the continuance of Mr. Ciccone's trial should be weighed against the 
government. 
e) The District Court's Busy Schedule Was Not A Valid Reason For 
Delaying Trial 
Finally, as noted, once the district court granted the State's motion for a continuance, the 
next available trial setting was almost six months later. Six months, however, was far longer than 
would have been necessary to track down witnesses or prepare to cross-examine the defense's 
expert. Accordingly, even if some continuance was warranted, the length of the delay was clearly 
attributable to the district court's congested calendar. As noted in Barker, "overcrowded courts .. 
. should be considered [against the government] since the ultimate responsibility for such 
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant." Barker, 407 U.S. 
at 532. Thus, the six-month continuance should weigh against the State. 
3. Mr. Ciccone Asserted His Right To A Speedy Trial 
The third factor in the Barker analysis is "[ w ]hether and how the defendant assert[ ed] his 
right" to a speedy trial. Id. Because the more serious the prejudice attendant to a delayed trial is, 
"the more likely a defendant is to complain," the "defendant's assertion of his speedy trial 
right ... is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being 
deprived of the right" to a speedy trial. Id. at 531-32. 
In this case, Mr. Ciccone clearly and unequivocally asserted his right. When the State 
sought a continuance on the eve of trial, defense counsel asserted Mr. Ciccone's rights for him 
(see Tr. Vol. VII, p.19, Ls.17-23), he argued vigorously against the State's motion (see Tr. Vol. 
VII, p.19, L.24 - p.24, L. 7), he complained that Mr. Ciccone had already been held in pretrial 
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incarceration for 276 days (Tr. Vol. VII, p.22, Ls.20-21), and he specifically asselied that "[w]e 
are ready to go" to trial. (Tr. Vol. VII, p.22, Ls.21-22.) 
As the Barker Court recognized, Mr. Ciccone's assertion of his right should weigh 
heavily against the State. 
4. Mr. Ciccone Suffered Prejudice As A Result Of The Delay 
The final Barker factor is the prejudice suffered by the defendant owing to the delay. The 
Supreme Court has held that prejudice in this regard includes: (a) the detrimental impact on 
career and family that is attendant to oppressive pretrial incarceration; (b) anxiety and concern of 
someone waiting for trial; and, of course, ( c) the impairment of the defense. Barker, 407 U.S. at 
532. Obviously, the last form of prejudice is of the greatest concern because it "skews the 
fairness of the entire system." Id. 
In the present case, all three types of prejudice appear to be present. Mr. Ciccone was 
never released on bond, so he obviously could not work or spend time with his family; he lived 
under a cloud of suspicion, which undoubtedly strained or destroyed the relationships he had 
formed with his friends in the Air Force; and he had to contend with the anxiety of waiting 
nearly fifteen months for his trial~ not knowing whether he might walk out of jail a free mall,- he 
condemned to a life in prison, or suffer a fate somewhere in between. 
In addition, it appears that Mr. Ciccone suffered actual prejudice as at least one witness' 
memory faded significantly by the time Mr. Ciccone was finally tried in January 2005. That 
witness, Darlene Shaw, the first person to arrive on-scene after Mr. Ciccone's vehicle struck and 
killed Kathleen, testified at trial that when Mr. Ciccone got out of his car and started talking on 
his cell phone, he said: "I got the job done." (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.518, Ls.5-18.) When confronted 
with the fact that she had never revealed this information before, Ms. Shaw adamantly stated that 
no one had ever asked her what Mr. Ciccone had said into his cell phone. (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.520, 
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L.16 - p.524, L.23.) However, that testimony was untrue; someone had asked her that precise 
question before-just two weeks after the incident (at Mr. Ciccone's preliminary hearing)-and 
at that time she testified that she could not hear anything Mr. Ciccone was saying into his cell 
phone. (Tr. Vol. II, p.34, Ls.5-9.) If Ms. Shaw's memory could have deteriorated so significantly 
by the time of Mr. Ciccone's trial, one must wonder how reliable any of the witness' trial 
testimony was so long after the fact. 
5. Balancing 
When all of the above factors are taken together-the relatively long delay, the vast 
majority of which was attributable to the government, Mr. Ciccone's assertion of his right, and 
the prejudice suffered-this Court should find that Mr. Ciccone's right to a speedy trial, as 
guaranteed by both the Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution, has been violated. 
C. The District Court Violated Mr. Ciccone's Right To A Speedy Trial As Guaranteed By 
Idaho Statute 
Idaho Code § 19-106 also guarantees to every criminal defendant in Idaho the right "[t]o 
a speedy and public trial," although it does not define "speedy." Nevertheless, Idaho law 
elsewhere provides as follows: 
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution 
or indictment to be dismissed in the following cases: 
(2) If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not 
brought to trial within six (6) months from the date the information is filed with 
the court. 
I.C. § 19-3501. This statutory prOVISIOn "supplements" the above-referenced Constitutional 
guarantees of a "speedy" trial, and has been interpreted to give "additional protection beyond 
what is required by the United States and Idaho Constitutions." State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 
257-58 (2000). 
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Under section 19-3501, the "good cause" that the government is required to 
demonstrate15 in order to have the defendant's trial continued beyond six months is evaluated in 
terms of the "reason for the delay," as that language was used in Barker. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "good cause means that there is a substantial reason that 
rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay." Id. 
For the reasons set forth in detail in subpart B(2), above, there was neither a "valid 
reason" nor "good cause" for the district court to have granted the State's motion for a 
continuance. The State was dilatory in investigating and contacting witnesses and it failed to 
show that any of those witnesses were truly unavailable; the defense was not remiss in failing to 
sooner disclose the curriculum vitae of its expert witness and, even it was, the State was in no 
way prejudiced thereby; and to the extent that Mr. Ciccone's trial could not be completed in the 
allotted time, that error was attributable to a miscalculation on the State's part and/or the district 
court's error in scheduling a trip that conflicted with Mr. Ciccone's trial. Accordingly, the 
district court erred in granting the State's continuance and then, later, denying Mr. Ciccone's 
motion for dismissal under LC. § 19-3501. 
D, . Based On The Violation Of Mr. Ciccone's Right To A Speedy Trial, His Convictions 
Should Be Vacated And The Case Should Be Dismissed With Prejudice 
It is well-established that violation of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a 
speedy trial requires dismissal of the case against him with prejudice. See Barker v. Wingo, 107 
U.S. at 522. While this is fairly drastic remedy, the Supreme Court has explained that "it is the 
only possible remedy." Id. 
Mr. Ciccone contends that dismissal with prejudice is, likewise, the appropriate remedy 
for violations ofLC. § 19-3501, at least insofar as those violations are found on appeal. Although 
15 State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 495 (Ct. App. 1987) ("The burden is on the state to show good 
cause for the delay."). 
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I.e. § 19-3506 provides that dismissal of a felony charge under section 19-3501 is not a bar to re-
prosecution for the same offense, that provision applies to dismissals granted by the district 
court; it says nothing about an appellate court's finding that a district court erred in failing to 
dismiss a case under section 19-3501. Thus, by its own terms, section 19-3506 is inapplicable 
given the procedural posture of this case. Indeed, the Idaho Court of Appeals has already held 
that an appellate finding of a violation of the defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial warrants 
reversal of the conviction. See, e.g., State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 626-27 (Ct. App. 2001); 
State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 497 (Ct. App. 1987). 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Upon Mr. Ciccone A Sentence (Fixed 
Life) Which Is Excessive Given Any View Of The Facts 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ciccone does not challenge the sentence he received upon his conviction for second 
degree murder (of the fetus); however, he does contend that the fixed life sentence he received 
upon his conviction for first degree murder (of Kathleen) is excessive given any view of the facts 
and, therefore, represents an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. Mr. Ciccone 
requests that the fixed portion of that sentence be reduced such that he may one day be eligible 
for parole. 
B. Given Any View Of The Facts Of This Case, A Fixed Life Sentence Is Excessive 
There are four recognized objectives for any sentence that is handed down in a criminal 
case in Idaho: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence (both individual and general); (3) 
rehabilitation of the defendant; and (4) retribution. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997). 
As a general proposition, therefore, a sentence will be "reasonable to the extent that it appears 
necessary, at the time of sentencing, to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society 
and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable 
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to a given case. A sentence of confinement longer than necessary for these purposes IS 
unreasonable." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Fixed life sentences, however, are somewhat unique. "A fixed life sentence is the 
harshest penalty available under Idaho law, short of a death sentence. It precludes any good time 
credit or parole. Absent an executive commutation (an event which the judiciary can neither 
predict nor assume), a defendant given a fixed life sentence will be imprisoned until he dies." 
State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 637 (Ct. App. 1988). Accordingly: 
[A] fixed life sentence should not be regarded as a judicial hedge against 
uncertainty. To the contrary, a fixed life term, with its rigid preclusion of parole 
or good time, should be regarded as a sentence requiring a high degree of 
certainty--certainty that the nature of the crime demands incarceration until the 
perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty that the perpetrator never, at any time in his 
life, could be safely released. 
Id. at 638 (quoted with approval in Jackson, 130 Idaho at 294-95, and State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 
667, 672 (1999)). Thus, a fixed life sentence will only be found to be reasonable "if the offense 
is so egregious that it demands an exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence, or 
if the offender so utterly lacks rehabilitative potential that imprisonment until death is the only 
feasible means of protecting society." Id. (quoted with approval in Jackson, 130 Idaho at 294, 
and State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 876 (2010)). 
In light of the general standards controlling the imposition of any prison sentence, as well 
as the specialized standard for imposition of fixed life sentences, Mr. Ciccone contends that his 
sentence for first degree murder is excessive. With regard to the general sentencing standards, 
the record, taken as a whole, demonstrates that a sentence which includes no possibility for 
parole is patently unreasonable in light of the circumstances of Mr. Ciccone's offense, his 
condition and character, and the minimal risk that he presents to the community at large. In 
addition, turning to the specific standards for the imposition of a fixed life sentence, the record 
simply does not support the conclusion that Mr. Ciccone utterly lacks rehabilitative potential, or 
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that his crime against Kathleen was so egregious as to demand the exceptionally severe sanction 
of a life in prison with no chance for parole. 
1. Applying General Sentencing Standards, It Is Clear That Mr. Ciccone's Fixed 
Life Sentence Is Excessive 
As noted, in reviewing any sentence for excessiveness, this Court must conduct an 
independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character 
of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. It must then determine whether the 
sentence imposed is a reasonable means of effectuating Idaho's four sentencing objectives 
without being excessive. 
a) Facts Relevant To Mr. Ciccone's Character, The Circumstances Of His 
Offense, And The Risk He Poses To The Community 
Albert Ciccone's life story actually begins with his father, Louis Ciccone. After college, 
Louis served in the United States Air Force during the Vietnam War. (Letter from Louis Ciccone 
to Whom It May Concern, p.l (undated) (hereinafter, Louis Ciccone Letter).) While he was in 
the Air Force, he "was injured and had three major surgeries .... " (Louis Ciccone Letter, p.l.) 
He also had complications which required further hospitalization. (Louis Ciccone Letter, p.l.) 
Nevertheless, Louis' Air Force experience appears to have been a blessing in at least one regard 
because it was through his service as an airman that he met and married his wife, June, and the 
couple had their daughter, Anna. (Louis Ciccone Letter, p.I.) 
While Louis was in the Air Force though, he had "many episodes of panic, depression, 
and mental stress which [he] received care for." (Louis Ciccone Letter, p.l.) Later, when the war 
ended, it came time to downsize the military, and the Air Force suddenly decided that Louis was 
"medically unfit" for further service and discharged him, he began to have trouble coping with 
all of life's stressors, including the impending birth of a second child (Albert). (Louis Ciccone 
Letter, p.l.) Louis ended up being involuntarily committed to the mental ward of the local 
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Veteran's Administration hospital on three separate occasions before his son even reached his 
thirteenth birthday. (Louis Ciccone Letter, p.l.) 
When Mr. Ciccone was not in the hospital (for his mental illness or for his ongoing 
physical problems), he grappled with his mental illness at home. He is a paranoid schizophrenic 
(PSI, p.18) and he writes that "I sit in the house and my mind goes wild," but "I don't feel 
comfortable out in public" (Louis Ciccone Letter, p.l). He concedes that as his kids were 
growing up he "may have been over sensitive to noise, fights and things that others may consider 
normal children's ways," and he may have been very strict with them, using "a belt on them 
when [he] believed they needed it," and sending their friends home and them to their rooms 
when they were "too loud or rowdy." (Louis Ciccone Letter, p.l; see also Statement of Anna 
Dusseau, p.l (pointing out that, because of his mental illness, her father was more sensitive than 
others to minor annoyances, that he seemed intolerant of a lot of things, and that he was a "hair-
trigger" in terms of his anger).) But there may be more to it than that, as Albert's mother reports 
that Louis was beyond "strict"; he was physically and emotionally abusive. (See June Ciccone 
Letter, p.2.) Albert confirms that his father whipped him with a leather belt, but goes on to say 
that, by the time he reached the age of ten,. Louis "resorted to using his fists to discipline" Albert. 
(PSI, p.12; see also PSI, p.13 ("My father beat me when I was a child, he said it was for 
discipline, but it was a little too much for me to handle.").) In addition, June says that Louis 
constantly berated their son. (June Ciccone Letter, p.2.) 
Interestingly, although Albert has every right to now be resentful of his father-both for 
the abuse and for being absent much of the time-he is actually very understanding of the 
limitations imposed by his father's mental illness, and very forgiving of his father's past 
behavior. In talking about his father, he says simply: "My father did the best he could and I love 
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him." (PSI, p.12; see also PSI, p.13 (reporting that Albert and his father mended their 
relationship when Albert left home).) 
Albert Ciccone's understanding and forgiving VIew of his father appears totally 
consistent with his character generally. One friend describes him as a "sensitive, caring person," 
with "a straightforward, honest personality." (Letter from Steve Boyles to Whom It May 
Concern (Feb. 14, 2005).)16 Another friend describes him as "polite, well mannered and 
respectful ... a great person, one worthy of my respect." (Letter from Tony DeLuke to Whom It 
Many Concern (Feb. 18, 2005).) A third friend describes him as "polite and considerate" and 
"always car[ing] passionately for those who he is involved with." (Letter from Lisa Austin to 
Whom It May Concern, p.1 (undated).) A former teacher and football coach describes him as an 
"outstanding young man ... honest, hardworking, and loyal," who, although not a great athlete, 
always earned the respect of teammates and coaches through his "unselfish attitude." (Letter 
from John Nemec to Whom It May Concern (Feb. 16, 2005) (hereinafter, Nemec Letter).) This 
individual goes on to say that "Albert Ciccone has always been one of my favorites. After thirty-
five years as an educator, I can honestly say that I enjoyed the best profession in the world 
because of people like Albert. He is warm, caring. and has a genuine concern for others." 
(Nemec Letter.) Finally, Albert's mother, who probably knows him better than anyone else, 
points out that he was always the family comedian because he was always trying to make the 
people around him happy. (June Ciccone Letter, p.1.) She describes him alternately as "a good 
and loving man" and as "a good and caring man"; she said he "would give you his last dollar or 
the shirt off his back if you needed it." (June Ciccone Letter, ppA, 9.) 
16 The letter from Mr. Boyles is attached to the PSI. 
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Consistent with his generally good character, Albert Ciccone has always been a law-
abiding citizen. 17 The present offenses are his only criminal convictions (other than routine 
traffic violations). (PSI, p.12.) He has never been a heavy drinker, and has never used illegal 
drugs. (PSI, p.12.) 
In addition, Mr. Ciccone has dedicated his life to public service. As noted, at the age of 
nineteen, Mr. Ciccone left home to join the United States Air Force. (PSI, pp.12, 16.) He did so 
because he wanted to serve his country and honor a family tradition of Air Force service 
(Mr. Ciccone represents the third generation of his family to have served in the Air Force). (PSI, 
p.12.) Although Mr. Ciccone was never a star athlete or received the best grades, he has an 
interest in, and a knack for, computers and other technology (June Ciccone Letter, p.2; see Louis 
Ciccone Letter, p.2); he made a fine Electronic Warfare Systems Technician in the Air Force, 
rising to the rank of Staff Sergeant and receiving exceptional performance evaluations. (PSI, 
p.16; Enlisted Performance Report for Period Jun. 19, 1996 - Feb. 18, 1998; Enlisted 
Performance Report for Period Feb. 19, 1998 - Feb. 18, 1999; Enlisted Performance Report for 
Period Feb. 19, 1999 - Feb. 18, 2000; Enlisted Performance Report for Period Feb. 19, 2000 -
lan. 20, 2001; Enlisted Performance Report for Period Jan. 21 ~ 2001 - Jail 20, 2002; Enlisted 
Performance Report for Period Jan. 21, 2002 - Jan. 20, 2003; Statement of Michael Pfirmann, 
p.l (undated) (hereinafter, Pfirmann Statement.).) 
Obviously then, something must be terribly amiss for Albert Ciccone, a decent, caring, 
hardworking man, to be in his present situation. That something appears to be his fragile mental 
state. The reality is that Louis Ciccone is not the only one in the Ciccone lineage who has 
17 While the State would argue that Mr. Ciccone abused Kathleen prior to her death, and that he 
also abused his first wife, those claims are unproven and Mr. Ciccone denies them. However, 
even if those claims are deemed to be true, they appear fully consistent with Mr. Ciccone's 
emotional and mental problems and, as discussed below, are likely manageable. 
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suffered with mental illness. Louis' mother (Albert's grandmother), now deceased, was so 
severely afflicted that she was hospitalized at least six times, received electro-shock therapy at 
least five times, and attempted suicide three times. (Louis Ciccone Letter, pA.) In addition, 
Albert's sister, Anna, has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and is under the care of a 
psychiatrist. (PSI, p.13; June Ciccone Letter, p.2.) Finally, and most importantly, Albert seems to 
have inherited the family trait, as he too very clearly suffers from mental illness. 18 
Albert Ciccone's sister indicates that Albert, unfortunately, has inherited some of their 
father's traits. She wrote: "Frustration, anger, hurt, loneliness, depression, sorrow, pain, 
boredom, all of those emotions seemed to come out in fits of rage in both men in our family, my 
dad and my bother." (PSI, p.13; see also PSI, p.19 (Mr. Ciccone's admission that he has a bad 
temper).) And, indeed, this seems to have been the precise problem in Mr. Ciccone's relationship 
with Kathleen. When his relationship with Kathleen really started to fall apart, Mr. Ciccone 
found it impossible to cope. He would call his parents crying and talk about how he wanted his 
wife and unborn child back. (Louis Ciccone Letter, p.3.) His father reports that Mr. Ciccone was 
having panic attacks and "was going out of his mind." (Louis Ciccone Letter, p.3.) One co-
worker indicated that he "seemed to be a nervous wreck," and "he seemed much mrue stressed" 
than usual. (Air Force Report § 2 - 7.) In addition, Air Force personnel noticed that Mr. Ciccone 
appeared "depressed and more tired," and even became concerned enough for Mr. Ciccone's 
well-being that all weapons were removed from his apartment and his roommates were 
instructed to keep an eye on him. (UNITED STATES AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL 
18 While it is tempting to assume that Albert Ciccone's mental illness came from his father's side 
of the family, it should be noted that June Ciccone, Albert's mother has also been treated for 
depression and actually attempted suicide while pregnant with Albert. (PSI, pp.13, 18.) 
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INVESTIGATIONS, REpORT OF INVESTIGATION §§ 2 - 4, 2 - 15 (hereinafter, Air Force Report; 
Pfirmann Statement, p.l.) 
Finally, things came to a head when Mr. Ciccone had an argument with Kathleen and she 
left him. (June Ciccone Letter, pA.) When that happened, Mr. Ciccone called his mother "to tell 
her he loved her and to say goodbye to her" (Louis Ciccone Letter, p.3; accord June Ciccone 
Letter, pA), then attempted to kill himself-first by trying to hang himself, then by trying to 
poison himself (PSI, pp.l7-18). 
Mr. Ciccone's suicide attempts were unsuccessful and he was involuntarily committed to 
Intermountain Hospital, a psychiatric hospital in Boise, based on the obvious conclusion that he 
was "a danger to self." (PSI, pp.17-18; Initial Assessment, p.1; Discharge Summary, p.l.) When 
he presented at Intermountain Hospital, Mr. Ciccone suffered from decreased energy, 
concentration, and appetite; he felt unable to experience pleasure and he felt hopeless and 
helpless; he was socially withdrawn; he felt anxious; he could not sleep; he was having obsessive 
thoughts; and, of course, he had suicidal ideation. (Initial Assessment, p.l; Discharge Summary, 
p.l.) According to his parents, Mr. Ciccone "was very shaky, couldn't put his thoughts together," 
and seemed not to even recognize them initially. (Louis Ciccone Letter, p.3.) He was diagnosed 
with Major Depressive Disorder, and given Effexor XR, an anti-depressant. (Initial Assessment, 
p.3.) During his stay at Intermountain Hospital, he was also given Ativan, an anti-anxiety drug 
(History & Physical, p.l); however, it appears that this drug was discontinued and, when he was 
released approximately ten days later, he was directed to continue taking the Effexor and 
Klonopin, a drug indicated to treat seizure disorders and panic disorders. (Discharge Summary, 
p.l; see also Air Force Report § 2 - 20 (indicating that Mr. Ciccone filled his Effexor and 
Klonopin prescriptions).) 
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Obviously though, Mr. Ciccone was not "cured" when, on October 3, 2003, he was 
released from Intermountain Hospital and, as noted above, learned that his new wife had 
contracted Chlamydia. When he went back to work, one of his superiors noted that Mr. Ciccone 
"didn't seem like himself' in that, while Mr. Ciccone was typically outspoken and sociable, after 
leaving Intermountain Hospital, his "attention span had declined" and his "speech and work 
seemed SIOW.,,19 (Air Force Report § 2 - 15; Pfirmann Statement, p.l.) This was "[q]uite a 
turnaround from the AI" this supervisor had known. (Pfirmann Statement, p.l.) According to this 
supervisor, Mr. Ciccone attributed the changes in his behavior to his medication, complaining 
that the drugs made him feel like he was not taking an active part in whatever was going around 
him; he said "it was like watching" his life. (Air Force Report § 2 - 15; Pfirmann Statement, 
p.l.) Thus, this supervising officer asked Mr. Ciccone's immediate supervisor to see if 
Mr. Ciccone's medication dosages could be lowered. (Air Force Report § 2 - 15; Pfirmann 
Statement, pp.1-2.) Mr. Ciccone's immediate supervisor confirmed that Mr. Ciccone appeared 
slow and sluggish because of the effects of the medications, and that he actually sent 
Mr. Ciccone back to Intermountain Hospital "to get the medication doses lowered." (Air Force 
Report § 2 - 10.) 
Apparently, the medication dosages were lowered (see Pfirmann Statement, p.2), but at 
some point during the next two weeks, some additional drugs were introduced into the mix. 
Mr. Ciccone reports that by the time of the crash at issue in this case, he had been prescribed 
Zoloft, another antidepressant, which he did not take because it "made [him] insane," and then 
Depakote, an anti-seizure drug (which is also used to treat the manic phase of bipolar disorder), 
which he says worked much better than Zoloft. (PSI, p.l8.) Apparently, he was also still 
19 Although Mr. Ciccone was suffering the side effects of his medication, it does not appear that 
he was enjoying the benefits, as his supervisor noted that he still "was never happy." (Pfirmann 
Statement, p.l.) 
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supposed to be on the Effexor and the Klonopin, but he had missed two doses of Klonopin. (PSI, 
p.18.) 
As noted above, the crash at issue in this case took place on October 16, 2003, less than 
two weeks after Mr. Ciccone was released from Intermountain Hospital, and just a few hours 
after the couples' counselor had intentionally provoked his anger by stereotyping and criticizing 
his Catholic faith,20 criticizing him for failing to accept responsibility for his suicide attempt,21 
and dismissing his feelings of abandonment. 22 (See Ir. Vol. VIII, p.1517, L.3 - p.1518, L.18, 
p.1525, L.9 - p.1526, L.II, p.1529, L.18 - p.1530, L.8.) At the time, despite all that he had been 
through, Mr. Ciccone was still trying to reconcile with Kathleen. Nevertheless, another argument 
eventually broke out, both Kathleen and Mr. Ciccone became angry, and Mr. Ciccone struck and 
killed Kathleen with his car as he sped down the road. 
Looking back on the events of October 16,2003, while Mr. Ciccone has not adopted the 
State's theory of the case or the jury's belief about what he was thinking when he hit Kathleen 
with his vehicle, he has nevertheless taken responsibility for her death and the death of his 
unborn child, and has expressed a great deal of remorse. When asked how he felt about his 
crimes, he wrote,- "[ dJeeply saddened. I would gladly trade my life to save my wife and child. I 
20 With regard to Mr. Ciccone's faith, the counselor testified as follows: "It's like Indians and 
alcohol. Everybody knows that Indians are more predisposed to alcoholism and that. I think 
Catholics are more predisposed to guilt and to blame other people for what is going on with 
them, at least in my clinical experience." (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1526, Ls.6-11.) 
21 The counselor chose to be confrontational with Mr. Ciccone about taking responsibility for 
what he called Mr. Ciccone's "alleged" suicide attempt even though he conceded he "didn't 
know what the suicide attempt was all about" because he had not reviewed Mr. Ciccone's mental 
health file. (Ir. Vol. VIII, p.1518, Ls.3-7.) 
22 The counselor spoke mockingly ofMr. Ciccone's attempt to articulate what he described as his 
"abandonment issues," expressing an apparent belief that a grown adult's loss of emotional 
support from someone that he loved and trusted does not constitute abandonment because 
abandonment "is like you take a little child of five or six, and you leave him somewhere for a 
week or two or a month, that's being abandoned." (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1517, Ls.20-25.) 
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am beyond sorry. I never denied responsibility for their deaths, but I did not murder them." (PSI, 
p.12.) At another point, he wrote: "I take full responsibility for the death of my wife and our 
child, but it was not in any way a deliberate action. I am deeply sorry for all of the pain I've 
caused my family and for the loss of two young lives." (PSI, p.l9.) Moreover, these statements 
appear not to have been made solely for the benefit of the sentencing judge; they appear to be 
genuine reflections of Mr. Ciccone's feelings since they are consistent with the statements he 
made to his mother all along. (See June Ciccone Letter, p.8 ("He tells me continuously how sorry 
he is this happened and how he wishes it would have been him instead of Kathleen who died."), 
p.9 ("He truly loves Kathleen and mourns her loss every day .... ").) 
b) The Foregoing Facts Demonstrate That A Fixed Life Sentence Is 
Excessive 
Assuming that Mr. Ciccone intentionally and premeditatedly murdered Kathleen (as this 
Court must in light of the jury's verdict), the trial evidence indicates that he did not commit a 
carefully-planned or sadistic murder; it demonstrates that, while in an extremely fragile mental 
state, he had an argument with his wife, he became angry, and after about a minute and one-half 
of stewing, he snapped and his anger erupted in a brief, violent outburst. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. VIII, 
p.l778, L.24 - p.1779, L.24, p.l783, Ls.I0-17, p.l784, L.22 - p.l785, L.3, p.l809, Ls.7-16, 
p.l819, Ls.19-25 (portions of the prosecutor's closing argument).) Thus, while his actions are 
reprehensible and tragic (as any murder is), the murder in this case is devoid of aggravating 
circumstances and, therefore, is relatively non-egregious. As such, Mr. Ciccone submits that, 
even if this Court were to consider the nature of the offense only, an appropriate sentence in his 
case would be closer to the statutory minimum than the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-4004 
(implicitly recognizing that even first degree murders may demand a sentence as low as life, with 
ten years fixed). 
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This is especially true when one considers the overwhelming amount of mitigating 
evidence in this case. As noted above, Mr. Ciccone has had a lot of mental illness in his family; 
he clearly suffers from mental illness; and that mental illness appears to have had a central role 
in his commission of the present offense. See I.C. § 19-2523 (implicitly recognizing that the 
defendant's mental illness--especially where it has a role in the commission of the offcnse-is a 
mitigating factor which should counsel toward a lower sentence); State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 
384, 391-92 (1994) (same). In addition, although Mr. Ciccone battles mental illness and may 
sometimes have a great deal of difficulty keeping his anger in check, he is generally of excellent 
character, he has led a law-abiding life, and he has even dedicated his career to serving his 
country. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (the defendant's lack of a criminal record and 
his prior military service were mitigating factors that counseled toward a lower sentence); 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (where the defendant has good character generally, 
and is a first offender, he should be afforded more lenient treatment). Finally, consistent with his 
impressive character, Mr. Ciccone has accepted responsibility for his actions23 and has expressed 
his deep remorse for his actions. See State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(defendant's expressions of remorse aLe a mitigating circumstance counseling toward a more 
lenient sentence); Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595 (the defendant's acceptance of responsibility is a 
mitigating circumstance counseling toward a more lenient sentence). 
23 While the State will no-doubt argue that Mr. Ciccone has failed to accept responsibility for his 
actions because he has failed to admit that intentionally and premeditatedly murdered his wife, 
the fact is that Mr. Ciccone has every right to maintain his innocence through this appeal, 
especially where one of the alternate remedies sought is a new trial. See, e.g., State v. Cesnik, 
(2005) (holding that a defendant cannot be punished for failing to admit guilt after a trial in 
which he asserted his innocence because to do so would be to nullify his right to appeal). 
Besides, the jury's fact-finding ought to go only so far when it comes to what Mr. Ciccone was 
thinking when the present offense was committed, for only he can truly know what his thoughts 
were at that moment in time. 
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Finally, a reduction of the fixed portion of Mr. Ciccone's sentence would not put the 
community at risk. Because Mr. Ciccone's crime appears to stem from his emotional fragility 
and his inability to contain his anger at times, it is infinitely reasonable to believe that with 
proper medication and mental health counseling, he could safely be released on parole. 
2. Applying The Specialized Standard For Fixed Life Sentences, It Is Clear That 
Mr. Ciccone's Fixed Life Sentence Is Excessive 
a) Mr. Ciccone Has Rehabilitation Potential 
As should be obvious from the foregoing discussion, Mr. Ciccone is not a career 
criminal, and he certainly is not a predator who seeks people out for the purpose of victimizing 
them. He is a man of exemplary character who, likely because of his emotional and mental 
problems, failed to keep an even keel in a turbulent relationship. Under these circumstances, it is 
infinitely reasonable to believe that with proper medication and counseling, Mr. Ciccone can 
overcome his depression and insecurities, and learn to cope constructively with his anger such 
that he could once again be a productive member of society. Accordingly, Mr. Ciccone's fixed 
life sentence cannot be justified based on any sort of finding that he is utterly lacking in 
rehabilitation potential. 
b. While Any Murder Is Reprehensible, The Murder In This Case Was Not 
Particularly Egregious 
As noted, while the crime for which Mr. Ciccone was found guilty is certainly 
inexcusable, the facts and circumstances of its commission make it clear that it is relatively non-
egregious. It was not committed as part of a killing spree; it was not undertaken as part of some 
sadistic desire to cause suffering or pain; and it was not thought out ahead of time and 
perpetrated as part of an elaborate plan. It was simply the product of any angry outburst, likely 
related to Mr. Ciccone's emotional and mental problems. Accordingly, Mr. Ciccone's fixed life 
sentence cannot be justified based on a finding that the murder in this case was particularly 
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egregious. To do so would be to find that first degree murder, in and of itself, is so egregious that 
it demands the harshest possible sentence short of death, but that clearly is not the case. See 
I.C. § 18-4004. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ciccone respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
conviction and/or sentence and either: order that the case be dismissed based on violations of his 
speedy trial rights; remand the case for a new trial based on the prosecutor's misconduct; or 
reduce his fixed life sentence (or remand the case for a new sentencing hearing) based on the 
excessiveness of that sentence. 
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